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ABSTRACT
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution has
historically been used to provide various protections to the press.
Sometimes these protections have allowed for intrusions into an
individual's personal privacy though. Current legal remedies for
such intrusions are particularly inadequate in today's Information
Age. There are four traditional privacy torts for invasion of
privacy claims: (1) the tort of invasion of solitude, (2) the tort of
public exposure by the media of embarrassing private facts about
an individual, (3) the tort of media publicity placing a private
individual in a 'false light" in the public's eye, and (4) the tort of
appropriation of a private individual's name and likeness. The
history of all four torts is discussed, and each tort's utility in suits
against the media is analyzed. In particular, the difficulty of
proving all of the elements of the tort is thoroughly reviewed.
Finally, this article discusses the emerging challenges for private
individuals to recover for invasion of privacy rights by the media
and whether First Amendment rights of the media interfere with
post-mortem subjects' rights.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CLASHES BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press. '  The "free speech and free press clauses were
designed to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 2 In fact, the United States
* Gina Angie Lee is a candidate for juris doctor at The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law, class of 2006. She holds a B.A. in communications and psychology from the
University of Michigan.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the
Refortification of Defamation Law's Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 665, 670 (1989)
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Supreme Court has even recently affirmed that the process of
newsgathering itself is protected by the Constitution.
3
Nonetheless, journalists have not enjoyed complete protections in
the course of their reporting. For instance, undercover reporters are far
from regarded as valued reformers when exposing social atrocities,
even when done for society's benefit.4 Rather than receiving praise,
these journalists have often been served with lawsuits, while in the
process of collecting truthful information on matters of public
interest. Such lawsuits may largely serve as an indicative reflection
of the public's waning support for surreptitious newsgathering tactics.
6
Further, the emergence of technology capable of instantaneous
photography and the growing omnipresence of the media have resulted
in a shift in concern for protection of the individual's right to privacy.
7
Such potentially intrusive methods of newsgathering have posed
special risks to the individual's right to privacy. 8 Unfortunately, the
remedies currently available to victims of unwarranted public scrutiny
are largely inadequate in today's Information Age. The only available
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
3 People v. Mitchell (In re Juror Names), 233 Mich. App. 604, 612 (1999).
4 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1999)(involving
a lawsuit against ABC for sending its reporters undercover as "employees" of a grocery store
in order to expose unsanitary working conditions).
5 Susan M. Gilles, Food Lion as Reform or Revolution: "Publication Damages" and First
Amendment Scrutiny, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 37, 40 (2000)(the current state of
media litigation involves holding the media liable for newsgathering torts rather than for
defamation). As a result, in addition to actual damages, general tort law allows the plaintiff to
recover nominal, special, general, and punitive damages. 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on
Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems §§ 10.3.1-10.3.5 (3d ed. 2000).
6 See Tracy Dreispul, Circumventing Sullivan: An Argument Against Awarding Punitive
Damages for Newsgathering Torts, 103 DICK. L. REv. 59, 70 (1998) ("Ironically, PrimeTime
Live's early investigative reports involved stories similar to those written by Nellie Bly and
Upton Sinclair" which had been historically commended and praised for exposing various
social ills.).
7 W. Kent Davis, Protecting a Criminal Suspect's Right "To Be Let Alone" in the Information
Age, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 611,612 (1997).
s For example, particularly troublesome is the current lack of protection for those citizens
merely named as suspects in criminal cases from the ensuing public scrutiny of their private
lives before charges are ever even filed. Davis, supra note 4, at 613. See William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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remedies are: 1) defamation suits against the media; 2) right to
privacy tort suits against the media; 3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress suits against the media; and 4) statutory tort suits
against the government.9
For instance, before one can successfully seek recompense for
damages t° in an invasion of privacy defamation action against the
media, one's status as either a "private" versus a "public" figure must
first be determined. The Supreme Court established in its landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that anyone classified as a
"public figure or official" cannot recover from the media in a
defamation suit without first proving falsity and actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence." In other words, damages in these cases are
"typically awarded only when a story's publication or broadcast is
itself tortious under libel or privacy law."' 2  Thus, there must be
sufficient evidence that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to
the veracity of the publication, demonstrating reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and actual malice. 
13
Nonetheless, the failure to investigate does not alone establish bad
faith on the part of the defendant 14  Instead, First Amendment
jurisprudence tolerates some "breathing room" for reasonable factual
errors when the media reports on matters of public concern. 15 Thus,
91d. at 615.
10 Damages include those injuries that flow from "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
"1 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
12 Jeffrey Grossman, Note, First Amendment Implications of Tort Liability for News-
Gathering, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 583, 614.
13 See, e.g., Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446,452 (Ind. 1999)(A private
individual involved in a public matter must prove falsity and actual malice in order to prevail
on a defamation claim against a media defendant); Huggins v. Moore, 726 N.E.2d 456, 460
(N.Y. 1999)(Under state defamation law, a private citizen involved in a matter of public
interest "must prove that the media defendant 'acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without
due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties."')(quoting Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341
N.E.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 1975)); see also Davis, supra note 4, at 618.
14 See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728-29 (1968).
15 C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind:
The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REv. 237, 289 (1993).
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even if a publication contains factual inaccuracies, it is not necessarily
defamatory on its face, because the primary purpose driving the First
Amendment is to promote open and free discussion of important social
issues. 16  Such leeway similarly extends to protect tortious conduct
that may occur during the newsgathering process as well, in order to
promote the discovery of valuable information.17 As a result, the U.S.
Supreme Court continues to weave such protections of a free press into
the growing jurisprudential fabric that attempts to balance the
competing interests of privacy and the First Amendment.'" After all,
the rights of a free press are designed to protect a reporter's "rational
interpretation" of events or statements during the course of
newsgathering. 9
To overcome such high hurdles successfully, plaintiffs began
seeking theories other than defamation upon which to sue the media.2°
16 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
17 Dynn Nick, Note, Food (Lion)for Thought: Does the Media Deserve Special Protection
Against Punitive Damage Awards When It Commits Newsgathering Torts?, 45 WAYNE L.
REv. 203, 227 (1999) ("If the balance is not tipped in favor of the media, it is unlikely that
journalists will pursue vigorous undercover newsgathering for fear of exposure to large and
unpredictable monetary awards.").
18 Id. at 732 ("To insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is
essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.").
19 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 519 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Cowras v. Hard Copy, 56 F. Supp. 2d 207, 208 (D. Conn. 1999)(plaintiff alleged
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of defendant's broadcast of
plaintiff's arrest for driving while intoxicated, instead of relying on a defamation claim); Med
Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D. Ariz. 1998)(relying on
the tort claims of fraud, trespass, and eavesdropping since plaintiff was unable to maintain a
defamation claim); Russell v. ABC, Inc., No. 94C5768, 1995 WL 330920, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
1995)(alleging intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy after PrimeTime Live
broadcast an undercover expos6 of plaintiffs business practices); see Food Lion, Inc., 194
F.3d at 522; Veilleux v. NBC, 206 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2000); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 44 F.3d
1345 (7th Cir. 1995); see Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1492-93 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)(holding that First Amendment principles do not preclude plaintiffs from suing a media
defendant for tortious conduct such as trespass); Special Force Ministries v. WCCO
Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)(holding that media liability for fraud
and trespass does not offend First Amendment principles); see also Carolyn K. Foley & David
A. Schulz, Damage Considerations When the Press Is Sued for Gathering the News, Libel
Def. Resource Center Bull., April 30, 1997, reprinted in 1 Libel & Newsgathering Litigation:
Getting & Reporting the News, at 129, 132 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. G-522, 1988). But see La Luna Enters. v. CBS Corp., 74 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)(holding that although the plaintiff could proceed with its
defamation claim, it could not assert fraud or trespass, because otherwise the "plaintiff could
succeed regardless of its defamation claim and the truth or falsity of the broadcast");
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By turning to causes of action based on tortious conduct during the
newsgathering process, plaintiffs are now required to meet the less
arduous burden of preponderance of the evidence. 21 As a result, not
only are they able to recover the same damages as in a defamation suit,
but now plaintiffs can also circumvent the "clear and convincing
evidence" burden of having to prove falsity and actual malice. 22 In
other words, "[n]ewsgathering tort cases substitute for libel actions
when a plaintiff establishes the proof required by the Sullivan test."
23
Private individual plaintiffs may hold media defendants liable for
24defamation pursuant to a simple negligence standard. Thus, the
Sullivan test must be applied to defamation cases involving a public
figure or official, but not to a private citizen. 25 As a result, in order to
recover successfully, a plaintiff is required to overcome the very
difficult obstacles of demonstrating that: (1) the media defendant is
not a public figure; (2) the publication was not of public concern; and
(3) the publications were false. 26 Otherwise, the media defendant will
likely prevail under First Amendment protections.
2 7
This article now turns to a discussion of the right to privacy tort
suits as a viable alternative to defamation suits for plaintiffs who had
been subjected to intrusive newsgathering tactics. The four traditional
privacy tort claims provide more realistic remedies for these
individuals who seek to reclaim their privacy after being thrust
unwillingly into public scrutiny by the media.
Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Tex. App. 1998)(holding that if a
plaintiff cannot maintain a defamation claim, he cannot rely on the same facts to file a claim
for tortious interference with contract).
21 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (5th ed. 1984) ("The plaintiff must
introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely
than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.").
22 Jacqueline A. Egr, Closing the Back Door on Damages: Extending the Actual Malice
Standard to Publication-Related Damages from Newsgathering Torts, 49 KAN. L. RaV. 693,
694-95 (2001).
23 Dreispul, supra note 6, at 76-77.
24 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-48.
25 WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES ANDM ATERIALS ON TORTS, 914-15 (8th ed. 1988).
26 Emily Heller, Jewell's Lawyers Say a Libel Suit Is a Probability, FULTON CoUNTY DAILY
REP., Aug. 27, 1996, at 2-3.
27id.
2005] LEE
11S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
II. DEFINING THE FOUR TRADITIONAL PRIVACY TORTS IN INVASION OF
PRIVACY CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST THE MEDIA
Prior to 1890, there had been no law establishing the right to
privacy, until Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis proposed a
new tort formally recognizing the invasion of privacy.28 Since then,
their article has been deemed "perhaps the most influential law review
article ever published" because of its innovative legal concept of
privacy, separate from the existing torts of libel and slander.29 This
new tort now recognized the individual's right to be left alone, thereby
protecting the private affairs of citizens from unsolicited publicity.
30
The tort of invasion of privacy was further defined in 1960 as four
distinct interests of the plaintiff: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4)
appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness for the defendants'
advantage.31 The Restatement (Second) of Torts later adopted these
four categories as the basis of the tort.32 Each of these four tort causes
of action will be discussed in full below.
A. THE TORT OF INVASION OF SOLITUDE, OR INTRUSION INTO AN
INDIVIDUAL'S PRIVATE AFFAIRS, BY THE MEDIA.
Of the four privacy torts, the tort of intrusion into private
matters is perhaps the one that best captures the common
understanding of an invasion of privacy. It encompasses
unconsented to physical intrusion into the home.., or other
place the privacy of which is legally recognized as well as
28 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
29 RICHARD A. EPsTEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 1218 (6th ed. 1995).
30 Prosser et al., supra note 25, at 951.
3 Id. at 389.
32 Epstein, supra note 29, at 1223.
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unwarranted sensory intrusions such as eavesdropping,
wiretapping[,] and visual or photographic spying.33
The right of privacy means, at its most fundamental level, the right
to be left alone. The right is "not one of total secrecy but rather a
right to define one's circle of intimacy - to choose who shall see
beneath the quotidian mask.",35 In other words, secret monitoring by a
defendant denies the speaker an important aspect of privacy of
communication - the right to control the nature and extent of the
firsthand dissemination of his statements. Clandestine recording by
the media of plaintiffs private conversation without authorization is
therefore often a per se invasion of privacy, regardless of whether the
conversation could have been overheard by a third party.37 As a result,
the right to privacy affords the speaker the reassurance that
information disclosed to an intended audience will remain non-
public.
38
The elements of the tort for intrusion of privacy are: (1) public
disclosure; (2) of a fact concerning the private life of an individual; (3)
which would be highly offensive and objectionable to the reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities; and (4) which is not of legitimate
public concern. 39 The last factor relates to "newsworthiness" and is
subject to a three-part test examining the social value of the published
33 J.P. Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351 (2004), at *35-
36.
34 Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273 (1952).
35 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 25 (1994) (quoting Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 534 (1971)).
36 Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 907, 914 (1999).
37 Id. The California Supreme Court has explained that the mere fact that a person can be seen
by others does not mean that he can legally be forced to subject himself to being watched or
observed by everyone. Instead, an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
home.
38 Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1427 (1988).
39 Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 214 (quoting Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118,
126 (1983)). But see Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)(where the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that an action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained when the
subject matter of the publicity is a matter of "legitimate concern to the public."). See also
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 Ohio App.
3d 163 (1985).
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facts, the depth of intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and whether
the person acceded voluntarily to a position of public notoriety.
40
State courts are witnessing a growing number of plaintiffs seeking
remedies for invasion of privacy by media-defendants "who
intentionally intrude, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another."4  Such invasions of privacy may be actionable,
particularly if juxtaposed with material that infers a negative
association with the allegedly offensive subject matter.42 Some courts
have gone so far as to acknowledge this formally as a constitutional
right "to be let alone. 43 Others have recognized this tort during the
course of newsgathering as an intrusion into private places,
conversations or matter.44
40 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d at 132.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 652B (1976).
42 O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 323, 331 (1974).
43 See Arnold v. Truemper, 833 F. Supp. 678, 684 (N.D. 111. 1993) ("The court recognizes that
the constitution does protect 'a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."');
Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (1956); see also Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143 (1982).
44 See generally J.P. Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351;
M.G. v. Time Warner Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623 (2001) (where the court found that plaintiffs
had shown a reasonable probability of success on their invasion of privacy claim. Further, the
invasion of privacy by the broadcasters far outweighed the values of any journalistic impact or
credibility.); Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 20 (2003); Brooks v.
Physicians Clinical Laboratory Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13603 (2000); Castro v. NYT
Television, Inc., 370 N.J. Super. 282 (2004); Steele v. The Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249
(2002); The Times Picayune Publishing Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472
(1999)(Plaintiff-newspaper filed an action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to
compel defendant United States to release a mug shot of a well-known businessman. Yet, the
court held that the defendant met its burden of establishing that the exemption under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA applied. Specifically, the requested information had been
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Therefore, disclosure of the mug shot could
reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy. Further, the court held
that disclosure of the mug shot did not serve any public interest that the FOIA was designed to
protect. As a result, the court found in favor of protecting the businessman's privacy from
intrusive newsgathering tactics.); Haskell v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d
541 (1999). But see Gales v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22937 (2004)
(where plaintiff-jurors who awarded a notorious $150 million verdict in a diet drug case
claimed invasion of privacy by CBS for producing a program focusing on multi-million dollar
verdicts rendered in rural areas of Mississippi. The court found that plaintiffs' invasion of
privacy claim failed because the broadcast made no reference to the jurors individually.); Tyne
v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (2003)(involving news stories, a best-
selling book, and a motion picture released dramatizing the lives of decedents lost at sea after
their commercial fishing vessel was caught in a severe storm. Florida's general rule is that
relatives of a decedent may not maintain a cause of action for invasion of privacy either based
For example, in J.P. Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co.,
plaintiff actors claimed that ABC News had invaded their privacy by
secretly videotaping their conversations and activities for a
newsmagazine story about casting workshops.45  Although they
complained the program portrayed them as desperate "whores" on the
outskirts of the acting community, their claims focused on the
intrusion of privacy rather than on the content of the broadcast.46
Specifically, the actors sought an injunction to ban the use of hidden
cameras as "news gathering tools."4  The court held that even though
the conversations may have potentially been overheard by others, the
actors nonetheless had a reasonable expectation that their
conversations would not be recorded.48 Yet, the court ultimately found
the actors lacked standing to sue on behalf of such an amorphous class
of individuals demanding an overly broad injunction. 49
States are now more frequently enacting legislation or developing
case law to prevent one from recording a conversation without the
other party's consent and knowledge.5 ° For instance, in determining
whether a recorded conversation is "confidential" within the meaning
of Cal. Penal Code § 632, the Frio test provides guidance: "A
on their own privacy interests or as a representative for the deceased where the alleged
invasion was directed primarily at the deceased. Further, the motion picture was not a
commercial purpose and thus was entitled to First Amendment protection. Moreover, the
portrayal of the surviving children was not sufficiently egregious in nature to establish a claim
of invasion of privacy. Finally, none of the facts disclosed were alleged to be true. Therefore,
the surviving plaintiffs had no invasion of privacy cause of action based on public disclosure
of private facts.); Harris v. Seattle, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3553 (2003)(The court concluded
that the plaintiff-politician failed to state a prima facie case against defendant-broadcasters for
unwarranted intrusion into her seclusion or an unjustified public disclosure of private facts
after airing two allegedly injurious reports about her. The fact that the politician gambled in a
public casino did not constitute a private fact disclosed by the broadcasts.).
45 J.P. Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351.
46 id.
47 id.
48 Id.
49 id.
50 In cases where only one injury is alleged, however, courts have applied the "single-
publication rule." As a result, a plaintiff may have only one cause of action for a damaging
publication rather than multiple claims for torts such as defamation, invasion of privacy,
personal injury, civil rights violations, fraud, or deceit. Strick v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 916, 922-25 (1983).
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conversation is confidential if a party to that conversation has an
objectively reasonable exuectation that the conversation is not being
overheard or recorded." '  Further, courts in California have
determined that an action for intrusion consists of two elements: (1)
intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter, (2) in a manner
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
52
The first element requires that the court determine whether the
defendants intentionally invaded the solitude or seclusion of another's
private place or conversation. There is no liability for examining a
public record concerning the plaintiff or for observing or
photographing a plaintiff in public. In other words, "there can be no
invasion of privacy [by intrusion] claim based upon the use of public
records as to which a plaintiff had no expectation of privacy."
53
Instead, to demonstrate an actionable invasion of privacy during the
course of newsgathering, the plaintiff must show that defendant
broadcaster penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy, or
pried into plaintiffs confidential personal records. But, the plaintiff
must have had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion in
the place, conversation, or data source.54  55
For instance, in Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., the
plaintiff had been involved in litigation with her ex-husband for nearly
30 years when defendant writer became interested in publishing an
article about it. The plaintiff subsequently sued the newspaper for
invasion of privacy, but the court held that the reporter's reliance on
public records did not constitute intrusion. Nor did the court find any
trespass, because the litigant engaged in "social" conversation with the
writer and did not ask her to leave. Instead, the court explained that
the fact that "supersensitive persons with morbid imaginations may be
able, by reading between the lines of an article, to discover some
51 Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766, 768 (2002) (citing Frio v. Superior Court, 203 Cal.
App. 3d 1480 (1988)).
52 j.P. Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351, at *37.
53 Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 406 (2001).
' See also id. (concluding that "[g]enerally, there must be a physical or sensory intrusion or an
unauthorized prying into confidential personal records to support a claim for invasion of
privacy by intrusion."); Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462 (2002).
55 Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.C. App. at 22-34.
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defamatory meaning therein is not sufficient to make them
[injurious] .,,56
Yet even an individual who lacks a reasonable expectation of
complete solitude, in that the conversation could be overheard (though
not by the general public), may still have a viable claim for intrusion if
a defendant reporter covertly taped the conversation.57 The "mere fact
that an intruder is in pursuit of a 'story' does not justify an otherwise
invasive intrusion." 58 In other words, "violation of well-established
legal areas of physical or sensory privacy - trespass into a home or
tapping a personal telephone line - could rarely be justified by a
reporter's need to get the story." 59 Such acts would surely offend the
principles of legality even if the information sought was of weighty
public concern.
The question before the court becomes whether the First
Amendment provides "a wall of immunity protecting newsmen from
any liability for their conduct while gathering news." 61 Courts have
long resisted extension of this right to protect actual crimes committed
in newsgathering, as there is no threat to a free press in requiring
members of the media to act within the scope of the law.62  Even
though courts recognize a number of routine reporting techniques,
such as uestioning sources, 63 which would generally not be
actionable, the First Amendment does not shelter the media from
tortious conduct. "[T]he press may not with impunity break and enter
an office or dwelling to gather news. ' 65 Therefore, it is undisputed
"that the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
56 id.
57 Sanders, 20 Cal. 4th at 923.
58 Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 236 (1998) (citing Miller v.
National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483-84 (1986)).
'9 Id. at 237.
60 Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)).
61 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973).
62 Id. at 995-96.
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 519 (1986)).
65 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 665-66.
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application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others." 66  Such an analysis has always
demanded a careful balancing of free press and privacy interests.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already held in Cohen that "truthful
information sought to be published must have been lawfully
acquired., 67 In fact, the First Amendment has never been construed to
render the media immune from torts committed during the course of
newsgathering. 6 8 Further, the right of a free press is "not a license to
trespass, steal, or intrude stealthily by electronic means into the
precincts of another's home or office., 69  Currently, no First
Amendment interests exist in protecting journalists from calculated
misdeeds.
70
Moreover, courts are often even more protective of privacy when
invasion by the press is greatly disproportionate to the relevance
between the newsworthy event and the facts disclosed. Generally,
66 Id. (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). For instance, the
Constitution does not relieve a reporter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a
grand jury subpoena, requiring him to answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation,
even if he might be required to reveal a confidential source.
67 Id. at 669.
68 Instead, the First Amendment guarantees reporters only the fundamental right to a free
press. As a result, the "newsworthiness of facts about a private person involuntarily thrust into
an event of public interest incorporates considerable deference to reporters and editors,
avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press to report
truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest. In general, it is not for a court or jury to say
how a particular story is best covered. Such a constitutional privilege to publish truthful
material ceases only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters of
legitimate public interest. Therefore, by confining interference to only extreme cases, the
courts avoid unduly restricting the exercise of effective editorial judgment." Shulman, 18 Cal.
4th at 224-25.
69 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971); see Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. at 669 (enumerating cases that concluded the media does not have a privilege to
violate generally applicable laws. Moreover, the Court added that the "well-established line of
decisions [held] that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972)(determining that courts
have not been interpreting the First Amendment in such a way as to insulate the media from
liability for violating general principles of law); Michael W. Richards, Tort Vision for the New
Millennium: Strengthening News Industry Standards as a Defense Tool in Law Suits Over
Newsgathering Techniques, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 501, 507
(2000).
70 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d at 250.
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intensely personal or intimate revelations will not be newsworthy,
especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of public
concern. Such a lack of newsworthiness greatly supports an
individual's claim for intrusion that publication yielded unwanted
publicity to private aspects of his life.
72
However, the debate grows increasingly perplexing for the courts
when journalists seek to exercise their First Amendment rights as
members of the media in direct conflict with an individual's desire for
privacy.73 Although citizens are entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy, some overriding interests of society may demand intrusion
74into seemingly non-public matters. Yet such interference of an
individual's seclusion may be no greater than what is necessary to
protect the countervailing social need.75
B. THE TORT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BY THE MEDIA OF
EMBARRASSING PRIVATE FACTS ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL
A claim for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts entails
the dissemination of confidential information about an individual that
a reasonable person would find highly offensive and which does not
pertain to a legitimate public concern.7 6  However, this tort "applies
71 Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 226.
72 Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1086
(1998); see also Keno v. Station KYW-AM Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21491 (2004)(State courts are also applying the tort of intrusion to contexts other than
that of the newsgathering process as well. For instance, in 2004, an employee alleged verbal
abuse, physical threats, and humiliation at the workplace after notifying her supervisor of
having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The court held that the employee's invasion of
privacy claim was not subject to dismissal because the complaint made sufficient allegations
of personal animus. Specifically, her supervisor had: directed her to be escorted from the
building by a security guard in front of other employees, sent an e-mail to all employees
stating that she should not be granted access to the building, required her to attend business
lunches where she was interrogated about her illness, and forced her to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation as a condition of continued employment. Thus, the plaintiff had properly stated a
claim for invasion of privacy that subsequently led to her wrongful discharge.).
73 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d at 991-92.
74 Id. at 995-96.
75 id.
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 652D (1976); See Riley v. Random
House, Inc., 2000 DNH 84, at *51-52 (concluding that New Hampshire recognizes a cause of
action based upon the public disclosure of private facts)(citing Hamberger v. Eastman, 106
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only to publicity given to matters concerning the private, as
distinguished from the public, life of the individual." 77 As such, courts
have long held that "to establish a claim for public disclosure of
private facts or intrusion into solitude or seclusion, the areas intruded
upon must be, and are entitled to be, private.' '78 This tort differs from
defamation in that although the injurious statement is necessarily
asserted to be true, the injury actually stems from publication of this
true but private matter.79
Thus, the specific elements required of a proper cause of action for
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts include: (1) the
disclosure of information; (2) that is highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (3) that is of no legitimate concern to the public. 80
However, the Tenth Circuit established that the "First Amendment
protects the publication of private facts that are 'newsworthy,' that is,
of legitimate concern to the public." 81 In fact, even if the private fact
is not in and of itself newsworthy, its publication will still be protected
if it has "substantial relevance to, '82 or "any substantial nexus with a
newsworthy topic."' 83  As a result, such protections afforded to the
N.H. 107, 111 (1964)(quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 867))(' [A] person
who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs
known to others ... is liable to the other."'); Further, the court explained that such
unreasonable interference occurred .' where intimate details of the life of one who has never
manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public."' Hamberger, 106 N.H. at 111
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 867, cmt. d).
77 Id. at § 652D, cmt. b. ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further
publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public."); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-
Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725,729 (1980).
78 Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311 (1998); Roe v. Heap, 2004 Ohio 2504 (2004), at *75
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b, 385)(explaining
that "if the record is not one open to public inspection, as in the case of income tax returns, it
is not public, and there is an invasion of privacy when it is made so.").
79 [Emphasis added] See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 652D,
Special Note on Relation of § 652D to the First Amendment to the Constitution (1977).
80 Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 233 Mich. App. 96, 113-14 (1999)(citing Doe v. Mills,
212 Mich. App. 73, 80-1 (1995)). Ordinarily, the jury must determine whether public
disclosure involved embarrassing private facts. Id.
81 Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981).
82 Riley v. Random House, Inc., 2000 DNH 84, at *54 (quoting Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308).
13 Gilbert, 665 F.2d. at 309.
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media have prevented a multitude of claims from succeeding under
this privacy tort.
For example, in 2002, a court had dismissed a claim for offensive
and objectionable public disclosure of private facts where plaintiff had
brought a claim against the producer of a television show in which the
she had participated.84 During the course of filming, the plaintiff was
caught on tape kissing a man. Plaintiff s kisses occurred in plain view
of the public, with a man inside the bar and on a city sidewalk.
Defendant broadcaster subsequently aired these video clips. In so
finding, the court explained that disclosure of the fact that plaintiff
kissed the man in the bar's bathroom was neither private nor so
offensive and objectionable that the producer should have realized that
it would be offensive.85 Thus, the court found in favor of the media
defendants, insulating their free speech rights from attack.
Other jurisdictions similarly recognize "newsworthiness" as a
defense for the media, invoking First Amendment protection.
86
Specifically, one California court held that "[d]ue to the supreme
mandate of the constitutional protection of freedom of the press even a
tortious invasion of one's privacy is exempt from liability if the
publication of private facts is truthful and newsworthy." 87 Thus, in
bringing an action for public disclosure of a private fact, if it can be
demonstrated that the contents of a publication are of legitimate public
concern, the plaintiff is unable to establish a lack of newsworthiness.
88
As a result, the publication would be protected if it had some
substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest.89
In Stern v. WGNO, Inc.,90 for instance, the court had affirmed the
television station's special motion to strike after finding there was no
probability of success on the plaintiffs claim of disclosure of private
84 Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (2002).
85 Id.
86 John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The Constitutionality of
Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1111, 1122 (1996)(citing Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (App. Div.
1970)).
87 Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1046 (1984).
88 Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 215.
89 Id. at 224.
90 Stem v. WGNO, Inc., 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
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facts against the defendant. The plaintiff student asserted a claim
against defendants for airing video of security guards searching him in
a report about juvenile truancy. The court found there was no public
disclosure of private facts, because the televised event had occurred on
a public sidewalk and in a public lobby. The plaintiff had clearly been
in the public view at the time. Further, the court held that the video
footage was reasonable given the important and newsworthy topic of
the story. The news station had a legitimate purpose in airing the
report and the footage was necessary to show that there was an effort
to address such issues in the community. Thus, the court held in favor
of protecting the media when important social values are implicated.
Moreover, a television station in Atlanta had broadcasted the name
of a rape/murder victim in violation of a state statute that made it a
misdemeanor to publicize the identity of rape victims, even when the
name was an official part of the court record. 9' The victim's father
subsequently filed suit against Cox Broadcasting, claiming an invasion
of privacy. 92 The television station asserted protection under the First
Amendment.
93
The U.S. Supreme Court again ruled in favor of guarding the
broadcaster's rights, concluding that, "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for
truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court
records." 9  Instead, if private interests are to be protected, it is up to
the States to better "respond by means which avoid public
documentation or other exposure of private information." 95 But, "once
true information is disclosed in public court documents, the press
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it."96  As a result, this tort,
consistent with the common law tradition, held that the media was free
to divulge facts that were already a matter of public record without
fear of incurring liability.
97
91 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1975).
92 Id. at 474.
93 d. at 476.
94Id. at 496.
95 Id.
96 id.
97 Prosser, supra note 25, at 968 n.5.
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Therefore, such protections favoring broadcasters discouraged a
multitude of claims from succeeding under this privacy tort. In order
to overcome such presumptions in favor of the media, not only must
the publication of private facts deeply offend a reasonable person, but
the personal information divulged must also lack any substantial
relevance to legitimate newsworthy matter.98  The most problematic
issue for courts is resolving this tension between the rights of a free
press and the privacy interests of individual citizens. Nonetheless,
there are still some jurisdictions that have elected to avoid tackling
such issues by refusing to recognize a cause of action for the invasion
of privacy by disclosure of private facts.
99
C. THE TORT OF MEDIA PUBLICITY PLACING A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL IN
A "FALSE LIGHT" IN THE PUBLIC'S EYE.
Plaintiffs also have the option of pursuing a "false light" claim
when they feel the media has wrongly publicized information about
them that a reasonable person would find offensive, portraying them
negatively in the public's eye.' 0
0
One California court defined a proper "false light" claim as one
entailing an act which exposed a person to "hatred, contempt, ridicule
or obloquy and assumes the audience will recognize it as such."10i
Specifically, to state a viable claim for false light invasion of privacy,
the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendants gave publicity to a
matter placing the plaintiff before the public in a false light; (2) the
98 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
99 Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393 (2001)(citing Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259 (1988)).
10
o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 652E (1976). See e.g., Nolan v.
Campbell, 13 Neb. App. 212 (2004); Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (2004); Mancari
v. Infinity Broadcasting East, Inc. d/b/a WBBM Newsradio 780, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23606 (2004); Mazur v. Szporer, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13176 (2004); Bloomquist v. Albee,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19573 (2004); Flatt v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic
Association, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (2003)(concluding that Tennessee recognizes a tort of
false light invasion of privacy); Myers v. The Telegraph, 332 111. App. 3d 917 (2002)(stating
that a false light invasion of privacy claim protects one's interest in being left alone from false
publicity); Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC d/b/a MRA Video, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205
(2002)("The overwhelming weight of authority applying Florida law has recognized a cause of
action for false light invasion of privacy."); Flowers v. Little, Brown & Co., 310 F.3d 1118
(2002)(holding that plaintiff, under Nevada law, had properly stated a claim for false light
because she had alleged emotional harm separate from injury to her reputation.).
101 Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 146, 161 (1990).
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false light would be highly offensive to reasonable persons under the
circumstances; and (3) the defendants had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed. 1
02
Often, this tort action has similarly proven difficult for plaintiffs
because of its close resemblance to defamation, resulting in the
dismissal of many of these lawsuits.' 3  In fact, some jurisdictions
refuse even to recognize a cause of action for "false light" in the public
eye invasion of privacy. 104 Nonetheless, in those jurisdictions that do
102 McCormack v. Okla. Publ'g. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980); compare Stem v.
WGNO, Inc., 806 So. 2d at 101 (citing Perere v. Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp.,
812 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001)(Louisiana law recognizes a 'false light' invasion of
privacy cause of action arising from publicity which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a
false light before the public. However, such a claim for invasion of privacy requires three
elements for consideration: a privacy interest, falsity, and unreasonable conduct.)).
103 Flowers v. Little, Brown & Co., 310 F.3d at 1132 (quoting 1 J.T. McCarthy, The Rights of
Publicity and Privacy § 5:105, at 5-241 to-244 (2d ed. 2000)("courts have yet to draw a clear
and distinct line between [defamation and false light]")); but see Moldea v. New York Times
Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[a] plaintiff may only recover on one of the two
theories [the torts of defamation or false light invasion of privacy] based on a single
publication, but is free to plead them in the alternative."). See also Easter Seal Soc. for
Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 530 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. App. 1988)("If
the publicity is an accurate portrayal of the public display, if the publicity is not unreasonable
and false, then plaintiff has no actionable privacy interest, even if the publicity has caused
embarrassment, offense, or damage."); Hussain v. Palmer Communications Inc., d/b/a KFOR-
TV, 60 Fed. Appx. 747 (2003)(where the court found that KFOR's news reports were neither
substantially false nor highly offensive, as they were reports about an unidentifiable person.
Further, plaintiff failed to offer proof that the defendants knew the information was false or
that they had acted recklessly in broadcasting the matter. As a result, there was no proper
claim of false light invasion of privacy.); Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., d/b/a
Warner Bros. Picture, 336 F.3d 1286 (2003)(The court held that plaintiffs, survivors of
decedent, did not have standing to fall into the narrow relational right of privacy exception to
common law false light invasion of privacy.); Weyrich v. The New Republic, Inc., 344 U.S.
App. D.C. 245 (2001); Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 789 So. 2d 355 (2001); Klayman v.
Segal, 783 A.2d 607 (2001); Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, Inc., 203 F.3d 714 (2000);
Davis v. Emmis Publ'g Corp., 244 Ga. App. 795 (2000); West v. Media General Operations,
Inc., d/b/a WDEF-TV 12, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25230 (2001).
104 Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 310 N.C. at 312; Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d
577, 579-80 (Tex. 1994)(concurring with other jurisdictions that refuse to recognize such a
tort on the grounds that it is largely duplicative while chilling free speech); Roe v. Heap, 2004
Ohio 2504 (2004)(the Ohio Court of Appeals declined to recognize the tort of false light
invasion of privacy); The Denver Publ'g Co., d/b/a Rocky Mountain News, 54 P.3d 893
(2002)(Colorado joined those jurisdictions that do not recognize false light as a viable
invasion of privacy tort. Instead, the state supreme court found that the tort was highly
duplicative of defamation. Further, the subjective component of false light claims had a
potential chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms.); Franklin Prescriptions Inc. v. The
New York Times Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12216 (2001) ("New York does not have a
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acknowledge the false light tort claim, plaintiffs must overcome
difficult challenges to establish a successful cause of action.
For instance, in Botts v. The New York Times Co., the court found
that the plaintiff had not stated a proper claim for false light invasion
of privacy. °5 The publicized photograph in contention portrayed a
young man drinking in a dilapidated trailer with a caption indicating
his name was that of the plaintiff. The court concluded that such a
publication did not constitute a major misrepresentation of the
plaintiff. 10 6  Therefore, there was no valid false light invasion of
privacy cause of action.
Likewise, in Schivarelli v. CBS, Inc., the court found that the
broadcaster's 30-second promotion of an investigative report about an
unidentified business owner who was allegedly cheating the city, was
not actionable as false light invasion of privacy. In so holding, the
court explained that the report had expressed an opinion without
factual content and was too conclusory to be objectively verifiable. As
such, there was no valid false light invasion of privacy claim. Lastly,
because the segment was broadcast for the noncommercial purpose of
promoting the defendant's news reports, the Illinois Right of Publicity
Act precluded the owner's claim for commercial misappropriation as
well.
Similarly, the chairman of a publicly-traded company, in Howard
v. Antilla,' °8 sued a reporter for false light invasion of privacy, after
the journalist published information about a rumor regarding a variety
of alleged prior convictions for securities fraud, violation of the White
Slave Act, conspiracy to defraud, and interstate transportation of stolen
property. Short sellers of stock in the company, who stood to profit
from a decline in stock price, were responsible for circulating the
rumor, however. Nonetheless, the court found that the reporter had
properly investigated the issue for over a month, interviewing a variety
of officials before publishing her article, offering evidence on both
sides without drawing a definitive conclusion. As a result, the court
common law tort protecting privacy against publicity that unreasonably places a person in a
'false light."')(quoting Cardone v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 884 F. Supp. 838, 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1995))(citing Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993)); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
105 Botts v. The New York Times Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785 (2003).
1I6d.
107 Schivarelli v. CBS, Inc., 333 IM. App. 3d 755 (2002).
108 Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244 (2002).
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concluded that the chairman had failed to establish that the journalist
intended or knew that the article falsely accused him of being a known
convicted felon. Therefore, the plaintiffs false light invasion of
privacy claim was not upheld.
Finally, the Illinois court in Salamone v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc., °9 concluded that the plaintiffs false light claim failed because
the statement made by the defendant newspaper, describing plaintiff as
a "reputed organized crime figure," was not verifiable as either true or
false. Instead, use of the word "reputed" in front of derisive
characterizations appeared to act as a safe harbor for the media."
0
Furthermore, the court in Riley v. Random House, Inc.,111 held that a
"statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false
before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least...
where a media defendant is involved."
Therefore in distinguishing an action for defamation from a claim
for false light invasion of privacy, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
instructed that in the former, "recovery is sought primarily for the
injury to one's reputation," that is, "what others may think of the
person." Yet in the latter, the "interest to be vindicated is the injury to
the person's own feelings." 1 2  Further, some falsehoods may cause
109 Salamone v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 347 111. App. 3d 837 (2004).
110 People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623 (2001)(citing 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-901 et
seq. (2001)(Ilinois law grants reporters a statutory, qualified privilege protecting them from
compelled disclosure of their sources. Thus, "reputed" as defined by whom did not have to be
divulged.)).
111 Riley v. Random House, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8596 (2000)(quoting Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990)(citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986)).
112 Oklahoma has recognized the false light invasion of privacy cause of action, holding one
liable for publicizing a matter concerning another that places the plaintiff before the public in
a false light, if: (1) the false light in which the plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (2) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be
placed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E; Colbert v. World Publ'g. Co., 747
P.2d 286, 289 (Okla. 1987); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d at 740.
Likewise, in Nevada, false light claims extend beyond defamation in one respect: a plaintiff
need not show injury to reputation. Flowers v. Little, Brown & Co., 310 F.3d at 1132 (citing
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615 (Nev.
1995)(quoting Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983)("'The false light
privacy action differs from a defamation action in that the injury in privacy actions is mental
distress from having been exposed to public view, while the injury in defamation actions is
damage to reputation."')); but see Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.
2002)(citing Fellows v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234 (Cal. 1986)(California, unlike
Nevada, requires injury to reputation for both false light and defamation.)).
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subjective emotional distress even though they cause no loss of
esteem. 113  In such cases, a false light cause of action would permit
recovery even though a claim in defamation would not.
1 14
Thus, the plaintiff must prove that he was portrayed "in [a] false
manner or that statements were untrue or misleading."" 5  Mere
negligence, however, is insufficient to establish the requisite fault
necessary to hold a defendant liable. 116  Instead, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has stated that the defendant must have "had a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity or in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of the publication.''
17
The First Circuit has held that "[t]he determination whether a
printed statement is protected opinion or an unprotected factual
assertion is a matter of law for the court.' 18  In making such an
assessment, the court must examine the context in which the injurious
statement was made. 119 A statement taken alone that might appear to
113 Flowers v. Little, Brown & Co., 310 F.3d at 1132; see e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E cmt. b, illus. 5.
114 id.
115 McCormack, 613 P.2d at 741; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652E(b)(stating that false light claims, like defamation, require, at minimum, an implicit false
statement of objective fact); Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 683 (1998)(the most
basic element of a false light cause of action is a false statement).
116 Hussain v. Palmer Communications Inc., 60 Fed. Appx. at 752; Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So.
2d 428, 430 (La. 1983)("More than insensitivity or simple carelessness is required for the
imposition of liability for damages when the publication is truthful, accurate and non-
malicious.").
117 Colbert, 747 P.2d at 289; Stem v. WGNO, Inc., 806 So. 2d at 102 (quoting Easter Seal
Society v. Playboy Enterprises, 530 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)(A television station
defendant does not have a duty to avoid "reasonable, accurate publicity because it embarrasses
and offends" the plaintiff or his family.)); see also Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master
Executive Council, 303 Ill. App. 3d 317, 332 (1999)(stating that in order to succeed on a false
light claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate a false statement. However, strong language
criticizing the plaintiff is insufficient to support such a cause of action.). Instead, the
"reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is determined by balancing the conflicting
interests at stake; the plaintiff's interest in protecting his privacy from serious invasions, and
the defendant's interest in pursuing his course of conduct." Daly v. Reed, 669 So. 2d 1293,
1294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
11 Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1st Cir. 1988).
119 See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992);
McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1987)(adopting "an approach that analyzes
the alleged defamation in the context of the article in which it appears along with the larger
social context to which it relates.").
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
be a factual assertion will nevertheless not be actionable if "'the
general tenor of the article negate[s] this impression."12
0
Furthermore, "where a statement obviously purports to be fictitious,
there can be no 'falsity of the publicized matter,' and, therefore, no
reckless disregard for such falsity.'
2 1
The current standard of liability applied by many courts is one of
"actual malice" which requires a demonstration of "knowledge of
falsity or a reckless disregard" for the truth of the matter published, or
for the false light in which the plaintiff will be placed.122  In other
words, "to achieve the proper balance between First Amendment and
privacy interests, the court held that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendants acted with actual malice if the plaintiff is a public official
or a public figure, or if the claim is asserted by a private individual
about a matter of public concern." 123 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court
120 Riley v. Random House, Inc., 2000 DNH 84, at *17 (citing Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at
727)(quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 at 21).
121 Botts v. The New York Times Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785, at *19-20 (citing
Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 295 (1988); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). Literal truth of each of the published facts, however, is not an absolute
defense to a false light claim. Instead, the facts themselves may be true, but "[lliteral accuracy
of separate statements will not render a communication true where the implication of the
communication as a whole was false .... The question is whether [the defendant] made
discrete presentations of information in a fashion which rendered the publication susceptible to
inferences casting [the plaintiff] in a false light." West v. Media General Convergence, Inc.,
53 S.W.3d 640, 645, fh. 5 (Tenn. 2001).
122 See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Tomlinson
v. Kelley, 969 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265
Ark. 628, 637 (1979)(requiring that to prove a false light claim, Arkansas demands a showing
of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence); Peoples Bank and Trust v. Globe Int'l
Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992)(explaining that "actual malice" involved the
publication of false information with the intention that the public would construe it to be
factual). Failure to investigate publicized matters, however, is not sufficient to demonstrate
"actual malice," even if a reasonably prudent person would have done so. Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
123 Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (2004)(The court concluded plaintiff had failed to
show that the defendant-broadcasters acted with actual malice. Plaintiff was found to be a
public official for purposes of her false light claim filed against defendants for airing two
reports and a series of promos allegedly invading her privacy. In so finding, the court held
there was a strong nexus between her position and the allegedly false statements.); West v.
Media General Convergence, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25230 (2001)(where the actual
malice standard was found to apply to a false light invasion of privacy claim against a
television station for broadcasting an investigative reporting series, entitled "Probation For
Hire." Such reports featured a probation counseling company and its president. The court
explained that because the company's president constituted a limited-purpose public figure,
the actual malice standard applied. Regardless, even assuming that she did not qualify as a
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has long extended substantial First Amendment protections to the
media when matters of public interest are concerned. 124 Yet courts are
still "divided as to whether this requirement likewise applies in cases
brought by other plaintiffs.' ' 125  Generally, however, a negli ence
standard will suffice in such cases involving 
private individuals. Ig
One of the universally required elements of invasion of privacy by
false light, regardless of whether it involves a public figure, is the
public disclosure of some falsity or fiction concerning the plaintiff.
127
Moreover, one court has held that in order to recover under a false
light theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants'
statements were "clearly directed at them.' 128  Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court appears to exhibit a pro-media inclination with regard
to false light invasion of privacy causes of action, requiring plaintiffs
to overcome difficult obstacles before succeeding on such claims.
public figure, the president would have been required to prove actual malice under Tennessee
law as an essential element of her false light claim since the subject of the news series
highlighted a matter of public concern.).
124 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967)(The Court found that application of the
"false light" claim was improper without proof that the media-defendant had publicized the
report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Thus, because the
Hill family failed to demonstrate "actual malice" on the part of Time magazine in publishing
inconsistencies in the article's version of the hostage ordeal, the publication deserved full First
Amendment protection for publicizing a matter of substantial newsworthiness.). But see
Woodard v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 616 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Ortega v.
Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 510 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(concluding that
Florida's fair reporting privilege extends to the publication of information contained in public
records only if the broadcast is a "reasonably accurate and fair" description of the contents of
the records.).
125 Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1105; but see Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d
1033, 1043 (1986) (where the court held that "the requirement to show malice in a 'false light'
claim applies only to public figures.").
126 Gary T. Schwartz, Article: Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion
of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. 885, 904 (1991).
127 Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 316 (1998)(Where the publication is free from material
falsehood, recovery under this cause of action may not be had).
128 Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enterprises, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 220, 225 (N.D. Miss. 1989) ("The
Fifth Circuit has recognized that [the 'of and concerning'] requirements are stringently applied
by Mississippi courts and indicated that it will do the same.")(citing Mitchell v. Random
House, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250, 1255 (S.D. Miss. 1988). See also Myers v. The Telegraph,
332 Ill. App. 3d 917 (2002) (holding that statements cannot defame a person or cast a person
in a false light unless they are "of and concerning" that individual)(citing Barry Harlem Corp.
v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390 (1995)).
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D. THE TORT OF APPROPRIATION OF A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL'S NAME
AND LIKENESS
Because the non-commercial publication of matters of public
interest is privileged and not subject to a claim of misappropriation, 129
some states have based liability for misappropriation on the use of
another's name or likeness for a commercial purpose, 130 such as for
advertising or trade. Additionally, the right to publicity also "has its
roots in the fourth type of invasion of privacy . . . appropriation of
one's name or likeness. ' 131  The Sixth Circuit has defined this
statutory right as "an intellectual property right of recent origin which
is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity. The right of publicity is a creature of state
law and its violation gives riht to a cause of action for the commercial
tort of unfair competition.
' '1 ia
129 Haskell v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d 541, 544 (1999); see also
Martinez v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 64 Ore. App. 690 (Or. App. Ct. 1983)(no
invasion of privacy by junior high newspaper after publishing photograph of plaintiff without
her permission to illustrate a non-commercial, newsworthy article).
130 [Emphasis added] Ohio law defines "commercial purpose" as the use of an individual's
persona "in connection with" a product, merchandise, goods, or services. See OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2741.01. Meanwhile, Florida misappropriation law prohibits the use of a
person's name or likeness to directly promote a product or service. See Fla. Stat. 540.08(1);
see, e.g., Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619,622-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Furthermore, defendants
who appropriate for their own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial
standing, public interest or other values associated with the name or likeness of the plaintiff,
are subject to liability for invasion of privacy. Botts, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785, at *20
(citing Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 908 (D.N.J. 1986)).
131 Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920; "This fourth category of invasion of privacy -
misappropriation of a person's name or likeness - has become known as the 'right of
publicity."' Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983)(This "right of publicity" differs from the first three types of the right of privacy; rather
than the protection of a person's right "to be left alone," this right protects an individual's
pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his or her identity.). See, e.g., Ruffin-
Steinback v. Hallmark Entertainment, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (2000)(citing Tobin v. Civil
Service Comm., 416 Mich. 661, 672 (1982))(quoting Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 95
fn. 10 (1977))("The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized a tort-claim for the invasion of a
right to privacy that includes misappropriation of a person's name or likeness.").
132 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Zacchini, 433
U.S. at 573 ("The State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual ... [which] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law."). But see Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 336 F.3d at 1286 (where
the court found that commercial misappropriation law did not extend to the use of the
decedent's name or likeness).
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For instance, in Cummings v. Sony Music, a magistrate judge
concluded that the plaintiff musician had properly stated a claim under
Florida's right of publicity statute.' 33  The use of the musician's
likeness on three compact disc covers was found to be actionable
under Florida law. Even under a narrow reading of Fla. Stat. ch.
540.08, an allegation of the public use of the plaintiff's photograph for
commercial purposes without permission established a cause of action.
The statutory right to publicity is distinguishable from the common
law right to privacy in that, under common law, "a defendant need not
appropriate a laintiff's image for economic gain to violate one's right
to privacy." -4  Moreover, "the privacy right is a personal interest
which cannot be transferred while the right to publicity is a property
interest which is assignable."'135 However, "statutes regarding the right
to publicity do not trump the common law right to privacy.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
newsworthiness privilege that allows the right of the press to publish
matters of public interest to take precedence over the common law
right to privacy. 137 Typically, this public affairs exception has applied
to news reports of television, radio, and the print media. 138 In fact, toavoid a collision between rights, some jurisdictions have even
133 Cummings v. Sony Music, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17394.
134 Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (2004)(citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. b).
135 id.
136 id.
137 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 (1967).
138 Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1955)(where the court
held that there was no common law right of privacy in a news telecast when a bystander
became an actor in a gambling raid on cigar store); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423
So.2d 426, 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)(no invasion of privacy when newspaper published
photograph of plaintiff clad in a dishtowel after police rescued her from estranged husband);
Stafford v. Hayes, 327 So.2d 871 (Fla. Ist DCA 1976)(no right of privacy claim when
television crew filmed individual at hotel bar after state capitol had been evacuated by bomb
threat); cf. Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Ct.
1993)(photograph of psychiatric patient walking with another well-known patient published
by newspaper was protected as newsworthy).
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recognized a First Amendment protection against misappropriation
claims for a person's name or likeness appearing in news articles. 139
If a communication is about a matter of public interest and there is
a real relationship between the plaintiff and the subject matter, the
publication is privileged. 140  The cases uniformly apply the
newsworthiness privilege to matters published by the media, even if
they are published to make a profit.' 4  Courts have even extended the
privilege to matters about private individuals that are of interest to thepublic.'r4'
For example, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy think tank
published a letter that included a statement made by the president and
mailed it as part of a fundraising campaign. 143 The president filed a
claim for misappropriation invasion of privacy. Yet the court found in
favor of the publishers despite the fact that the letter had a commercial
purpose. Instead, because the publication attempted to educate its
readers on a number of public policy issues, it fell within the
protective ambit of the First Amendment as a matter of public interest.
To recover under a misappropriation of identity theory, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he was identified by the defendant. 44
"However, the mere public mention of a plaintiffs name does not
constitute an appropriation of its value. '14 5  Instead, use of the
139 Haskell v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d at 545; see also Bosley, 310 F.
Supp. 2d at 924 ("In modem times, one could extend this analysis to conclude that information
relating to a legitimate public interest on an internet web page is protected communication.").
140 Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1988); Lane v. Random House,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995).
141 Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958); Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678
F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860
(1979); Stephano v. News Group Pub., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (1984).
142 Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955); Everett v. Carvel
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 734 (1972). See also Scelfo v. Rutgers University, 116 N.J. Super. 403
(N.J. Super. 1971)(citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966))("In balancing the societal
interest in free speech and press against the individual interest in reputation, courts have
chosen not to limit the former except to prevent injury from defamatory statements reasonably
susceptible of a definite application to a particular individual.").
143 Battaglieri v. Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 261 Mich. App. 296 (2004).
144 Gales v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22937, at * 37.
14 5 Botts, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785, at *20 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C). Unless use of the name or likeness of plaintiff actually adds value to or assists in
selling the product at issue, "the defendant is free to [use] any name he likes, whether there is
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plaintiffs name or likeness must be primarily for trade puroses,
lacking any redeeming public interest, news, or historical value. In
defining "for the purposes of trade," the court in Ruffin-Steinback v.
Hallmark Entertainment omitted "the use of a person's identity in
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses."'
147
Therefore, the simple fact that the publisher was successful in
obtaining a commercial advantage from an otherwise permitted use of
another's identity does not render the appropriation actionable. 1
48
As described by the Restatement:
The value of a plaintiff's name is not appropriated by mere
mention of it, or by reference to it in connection with
legitimate mention of his public activities; nor is the value of
his likeness appropriated when it is published for purposes
other than taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or
other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.
No one has the right to object merely because his name or
his appearance is brought before the public, since neither is
in any way a private matter and both are open to public
observation. It is only when the publicity is given for the
purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the
commercial or other values associated with the name or the
likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the
defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for
example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to
only one person or a thousand others of the same name." Botts, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23785, at *21 (quoting Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ill.
1982)).
146Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 910. "Even if the defendant is engaged in the business of
publication of... a newspaper... [for] profit, the incidental publication of a plaintiff's name
is not a commercial use of the name or likeness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C. As a result, even though a newspaper is not a philanthropic organization, it is
nonetheless not liable for appropriation to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.
Id.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). Instead, a person's
identity of likeness are used "for the purposes of trade ... if they are used in advertising the
user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in
connection with services rendered by the user." Id.
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995).
IUS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental
publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. 
149
The tort of commercial appropriation is therefore founded on the
recognition that an individual has an interest in his name or likeness
"in the nature of a property right."'' 50 Its most common form consists
of "the appropriation and use of the plaintiffs name or likeness to
advertise the defendant's business or product."'' In other words, the
use of plaintiffs name or likeness "for trade purposes" is where a
defendant seeks to capitalize on another's likeness for purposes other
than the news. 152 One reason for imposition of such tort liability for
commercial misappropriation is to avoid the unjust enrichment that
would result from uncompensated use of the name or likeness of
another. 1
5 3
For example, in Villalovos v. Sundance Associates, Inc., 1 54 the
court found that the plaintiff had stated a viable claim for
appropriation as well as for false light invasion of privacy. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had published lewd and scandalous
statements about her without her knowledge or consent. The
defendant publishes and distributes a nationwide hardcore
pornographic magazine. In one of its issues, the defendant had
published a personal advertisement that included a photograph of a
woman soliciting adulterous and sexually provocative acts. The
advertisement also included the plaintiffs first name, last initial, and
home address, although the picture was not that of plaintiff. The court
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, comment d (1977) (Restatement definition
of "invasion of privacy" adopted by Kansas).
150 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. at 297 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 652C comment a).
151 Id., comment b.
152 See Faber v. Condecor, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (1984); see also Tellado v. Time-Life
Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (D.N.J. 1986)("Under New Jersey common law,
defendants would be liable for the tort of misappropriation of likeness only if defendant's use
of plaintiff's likeness was for a predominantly commercial purpose, i.e., if defendant was
seeking to capitalize on defendant's likeness for purposes other than the dissemination of news
of information.").
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 6521 comment b (noting that "appropriation
of name or likeness... involves an aspect of unjust enrichment.").
154 Villalovos v. Sundance Associates, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 387 (2003).
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upheld plaintiff's appropriation and false light claims after finding that
her complaint clearly alleged facts that were entirely relevant to the
dispute. Moreover, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act 155 expressly
forbids the use of an individual's identity for commercial purposes
without having first obtained written consent.
156
Similarly, in Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 157 the plaintiff contestant,
having worked as a news anchor for approximately a decade, was a
regional celebrity in Ohio. The plaintiff had participated in a wet T-
shirt contest filmed by the defendant, a producer of adult videotapes.
In a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff alleged that
defendants' sale of the videos and use of her images on their websites
violated her right of publicity as protected by state statutes and
common law. 1'First, the plaintiff argued that her implied consent to
being photographed did not satisfy the requisite element of express
oral consent from each contestant to permit commercial use of her
images, as required by Florida statute. Further, Ohio law also
prohibits the publication of another's name or likeness for commercial
use, drawing from the plaintiffs "reputation, prestige, or other value
associated with him, for purposes of publicity." 59
The court agreed, granting plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief.
In so doing, the court concluded that the prominent displays of her
name, image, and likeness on the cover of defendants' video and
website were not merely "incidental to the promotion" of their
products, but rather constituted an advertisement. Further, even as
commercial speech, the images of the plaintiff neither contained
expressive nor editorial content protected under the First Amendment.
As such, the court upheld her right of publicity claim against the
defendant broadcasters.
Yet in 2003, a celebrity plaintiff had filed a complaint against an
entertainer and several production companies, claiming he had been
the inspiration for a cartoon character that appeared in a television
155 The Right of Publicity Act, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/1 et seq (1999).
156 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/30(a) (1999).
157 Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (2004).
158 Id. at 920 ("Ohio and Florida statutes protect one's right of publicity, stating that an
individual has the right to own, protect, and commercially exploit his or her own name,
likeness, or persona."); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02 and Fla. Stat. ch. 540.08.
159 Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47
Ohio St.2d 224, 231 (Ohio 1976)).
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comedy. 160 Although, like in Villalovos, the individual similarly
asserted violations of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act and common
law invasion of privacy, the court refused to acknowledge any valid
claims here. Instead, the court dismissed the action finding that the
state's Right of Publicity Act exempted artistic works from its
coverage, including television productions, thereby avoiding First
Amendment issues. The common law claims' 61 were also dismissed
because the famous individual had no right to object merely because
his name or appearance were brought before the public, because
neither constituted a private matter but instead were open to public
observation.
Likewise, in Castro v. NYT Television, patient plaintiffs sued after
the defendants had filmed them while they were being treated at the
emergency room. Although they had signed consent forms, the
patients claim that they had been in no condition to do so.162 The court
agreed, holding that the New Jersey Hospital Patients Bill of Rights
Act clearly intended to allow only for complaints in a regulatory
context. Because their likenesses had not been used for commercial
purposes, however, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a proper common law appropriation claim.
Moreover, an absence of evidence that a defendant magazine had
actually capitalized on the plaintiffs likeness proved to be the
downfall of the plaintiffs' claim in Stanley v. General Media
Communications, Inc.16 3  Two high school students had sued the
publisher of a sexually-oriented magazine alleging false light invasion
-of privacy and misappropriation. The female students had participated
160 See Collier v. Eddie Murphy Productions, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4821 (2003).
161 Several exceptions exist to the common law right to persona and image. For instance,
"incidental use of one's name or likeness is permissible." Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920
(citing Vinci v. American Can Co., 69 Ohio App. 3d 727 (Ohio 1990)(where the court held
that informational blurbs about weight-lifting Olympic gold medalist, Charles Vinci, on Dixie
Cups was merely incidental to the promotion of the cups, thus permissible)). One's name and
appearance themselves are not private, and may be brought before the public. Vinci, 69 Ohio
App. 3d at 727. Finally, a legitimate public interest exception exists in that, "[o]ne of the
primary limitations upon the right of privacy is that this right does not prohibit the publication
of matters of general or public interest, or the use of the name or picture of a person in
connection with the publication of legitimate news." Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 216 (Fla.
1944)(quoting 41 Am. Jur. 937-38). Nevertheless, "public or general interest" is not to be
construed in such a way to imply mere curiosity. Id. (quoting 41 Am. Jur. 935).
162 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 282 (2004).
163 Stanley v. General Media Communications, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (2001).
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in a contest while on Spring Break, in which each contestant was
blindfolded while she unwrapped a condom and placed it on a white
plastic phallus. Although the students concede they did not have any
expectation of privacy during the contest, they nonetheless objected to
their photograph being published in the magazine. The court
ultimately held that although the students were identified by name and
hometown, there was no evidence to suggest that they would be easily
identifiable to the general public. 164 As a result, their misappropriation
claim must fail. 1 5  Finally, because neither the photo nor the
accompanying text was false, the students' false light claim was
similarly dismissed.
Lastly, in order to establish unjust enrichment as a basis fot quasi-
contractual liability, "a plaintiff must show both that a defendant
received a benefit and that retention of the benefit would be unjust."'1 66
Such liability will be imposed only if the "plaintiff expected
remuneration from the defendant, or where, if the true facts had been
known to the plaintiff, he would have expected remuneration from
defendant, at the time the benefit was conferred.' 67 Absent express
agreement, a member of the general public who is subject to
videotaping for a television program cannot reasonably expect that he
or she will receive payment from the producer of the show. 68 In fact,
a substantial First Amendment issue would be raised if a court were to
find a right of compensation in such circumstances.
169
164 "[T]he public must be able to identify the person from the photograph or drawing, and the
defendant must have capitalized upon the likeness of that person in order to sell more
magazines or newspapers." Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1360 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
165 Id. Likewise, in Botts v. The New York Times Co., the court found that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a valid cause of action for misappropriation, because the plaintiffs name
was not used for trade purposes nor was it tied to the organization which the ad promoted.
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23785. Furthermore, a court dismissed a misappropriation claim filed
against the producer of a television show in which the plaintiff had appeared arising from the
use of her likeness in advertisements for the show. The court explained that dismissal was
proper because the show constituted an expressive work subject. Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 2d 1118 (2002).
166 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994).
167 Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 105, 109 (App. Div. 1966).
168 Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. at 300.
169 Id.; compare Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-78 (1977)
with Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967).
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III. NEW CHALLENGES IN TODAY'S INFORMATION AGE AFFECTING THE
INJURED PRIVATE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO RECOVERY FOR INVASION OF
PRIVACY TORTS.
In light of the pro-media presumption of courts and the hardships
already imposed on the private plaintiff in proving any intrusion of
seclusion claim, today's Information Age introduces a medley of new
challenges. Society's fervent interest in sensitive issues demands the
exercise of the public's "right to know." In order for journalists to
report accurately and fully, it is essential to encourage an uninhibited,
spirited press. In the Information Age, however, the citizen's right to
privacy is even further diminished in the face of the media's growing
freedom to report. With a multitude of outlets and venues for
disseminating private yet newsworthy information about public figures
and officials, the press necessarily infringes on their right to solitude.
Modern technology 17 appears to favor the press by allowing the
press to invoke First Amendment rights when confronted by claims of
intrusive newsgathering or publication. Special concerns may
consequently arise with respect to the privacy of individual citizens,
particularly those who became unwillingly or inadvertently exposed to
intense public scrutiny as the subject of a criminal investigation. As a
result, it is clear that special precautionary measures must be taken to
insure that the freedom of the press does not outweigh the citizen's
right to privacy.
From a public policy standpoint, in order to maintain the proper
balance, a court must "step in and protect the media from tort liability
when it expressly believes that failing to act would result in a chilling
effect on the press' ability to report the news." 17  Holding the media
liable for damages resulting from torts incurred durinq newsgathering
processes will result in such a chilling of the media. The fear of
liability forces journalists to grow overly cautious, discouraging them
170 An interesting discourse has been evolving discussing media rights and the potential
remedies, if any, for an invasion of privacy on the Internet.
'71 Nick, supra note 17, at 225.
172 Carolyn K. Foley & David A. Schulz, Damage Considerations When the Press Is Sued for
Gathering the News, Libel Def. Resource Center Bull., April 30, 1997, reprinted in 1 Libel &
Newsgathering Litigation: Getting & Reporting the News, at 129, 201 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-522, 1988).
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from use of certain newsgathering techniques, thereby preventingthe
discovery of pertinent information and effectively chilling speech.
IV. Do THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REPORT ON
NEWSWORTHY MATrERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN COLLIDE WITH THE
"RIGHTS" OF POST-MORTEM SUBJECTS?
To date, courts have been unable to provide a clear answer to the
increasingly complex question as to whether individuals maintain their
right to privacy following their death. For instance, Florida has a
general rule which states that relatives of a decedent may not maintain
a cause of action for invasion of privacy "either based on their own
privacy interests or as a representative for the deceased where the
alleged invasion was directed . . . primarily at the deceased."
174
However, the only exception to this rule precluding derivative false
light claims "occurs when plaintiffs experience an independent
violation of their own personal privacy rights other than the violation
alleged to have occurred indirectly by virtue of the publicity given to
the deceased .... " Such an exception exists to recognize that the
"relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in protecting
their rights in the character and memory of the deceased as well as the
right to recover for their own humiliation and wounded feelings caused
by the publication."' 
76
Nonetheless, such a "relational right of privacy" exception is still
very limited and rare, applying only where "a defendant's conduct
towards a decedent [is] found to be sufficiently egregious to give rise
to an independent cause of action in favor of members of [the]
decedent's immediate family."' 77  In rejecting a proper "relational"
right of privacy claim, the Florida courts have expressly required that a
173 Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering Torts and the
Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 526 (1998).
174 Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 336 F. 3d at 1292 (quoting Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.
2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
175 Williams v. Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
176 Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624.
177 Id. (cautioning that relatives "must shoulder a heavy burden in establishing [such] a cause
of action."). Further, "while the Florida courts have expressly declined to foreclose all
invasion of privacy actions brought by the relatives of a decedent, it is clear that such actions
are heavily disfavored." Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 336 F.3d at 1292.
LEE
1/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
defendant's conduct constitute "egregious" behavior, not merely
inaccurate or dramatized. 78  Therefore, such an exception does not
provide a "derivative cause of action for minor technical inaccuracies,
or even major ones."' 179
The case law remains scarce as to the rights to privacy of post-
mortem subjects, however. So far, Florida seems to have deciphered
the clearest and most manageable rule for other jurisdictions to look to
when confronted with such questions. Nonetheless, this remains a
growing area of jurisprudence that legal scholars and experts continue
to observe and monitor until more lucid and definitive answers are
derived.
V. CONCLUSION
As media law slowly begins to take shape in light of citizens' right
to privacy, recognition of such issues relating to "defamation, invasion
of privacy, reporter's privilege, cameras in the courtroom, and the
contours of First Amendment" help to expand protections afforded to
the media during the newsgathering process. 60 Among the many
states attempting to strike the proper balance between adequate
protection of journalists' First Amendment rights and the individual's
right to privacy, Idaho's judiciary' 8 1 has begun defining free speech
boundaries. 1
82
178 Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624.
179 See id.; Williams, 575 So. 2d at 689-90.
180 Debora K. Kristensen, Law in Idaho: Where Are We?, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 395, 396 (2004).
181 Russell A. Joki, In the Public Interest: Idaho Communications Law & Issues Handbook 1
(New Forums Press, Inc. 2003)(citing Prof. Dennis Colson, University of Idaho).
182 See, e.g., Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc., 138 Idaho 550, 67 P.3d 29 (2003), cert. denied,
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Until recently, the Idaho judiciary has relied upon U.S. Supreme
Court precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Torts for delineating
limitations of the media's free speech. 8 3 However, as best stated by
one of its own courts, what really lies "[a]t the heart of each of these
[invasion of privacy] claims is the definition of what constitutes a
'reasonable expectation of privacy. ' ' ' 184  In fact, an Idaho court
recently defined "reasonable expectation of privacy" as being "relative
to the customs of the time and place, and is determined by the norm of
the ordinary person. ' 85  As it stands, the struggle to define the
nebulous limits of a free press and an individual's right to privacy
remains as the courts further wrestle with the inherent line-drawing
problem. Nonetheless, for the time being, it would appear that so long
as the media respects the citizen's right to privacy within the
-boundaries of the four tort remedies available in the instance of an
invasion, the two rights can co-exist harmoniously.
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